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Introduction
An important task of cryptographic research is to verify cryptographic implementations for security flaws, in particular to avoid so-called timing attacks. Such attacks consist in measuring the execution time of an implementation on its execution platform. For instance, Brumley and Boneh [12] showed that it was possible to mount remote timing attacks by against OpenSSL's implementation of the RSA decryption operation and to recover the key. Albrecht and Paterson [3] showed that the two levels of protection offered against the Lucky 13 attack from [2] in the first release of the new implementation of TLS were imperfect. A related class of attacks are cache-based attacks in which a malicious party is able to obtain memory-access addresses of the target program which may depend on secret data through observing cache accesses. Such attacks allow to recover the complete AES keys [17] .
A possible countermeasure is to follow a very strict programming discipline called constant-time programming. Its principle is to avoid branchings controlled by secret data and memory load/store operations indexed by secret data. Recent secure C libraries such as NaCl [10] or mbedTLS 1 follow this programming discipline. Until recently, there was no rigorous proof that constant-time algorithms are protected to cache-based attacks. Moreover, many cryptographic implementations such as PolarSSL AES, DES, and RC4 make array accesses that depend on secret keys and are not constant time. Recent works [6, 4, 11] fill this gap and develop the first formal analyzes that allow to verify if programs are correct with respect to the constant-time paradigm.
An interesting extension was brought by Almeida et al. [4] who enriched the constant-time paradigm "distinguishing not only between public and private input values, but also between private and publicly observable output values". This distinction raises interesting technical and theoretical challenges. Indeed, constant-time implementations in cryptographic libraries like OpenSSL include optimizations for which paths and addresses can depend not only on public input values, but also on publicly observable output values. Hence, considering only input values as non-secret information would thus incorrectly characterize those implementations as non-constant-time. [4] also develops a verification technique based on symbolic execution. However, the soundness of their approach depends in practice on the soundness of the underlying symbolic execution engine, which is very difficult to guarantee for real-world programs with loops. Moreover, their product construction can be very expensive in the worst case.
In this paper we deal with statically checking programs for output-sensitive constant-time correctness: programs can still do branchings or memory accesses controlled by secret data if the information that is leaked is subsumed by the normal output of the program. To give more intuition about the property that we want to deal with, let us consider the following example, where ct eq is a constant time function that allows to compare the arguments: good = 1; for (i=0; i<B_Size; i++){good = good & ct_eq(secret [i] ,in_p[i]);} if (!good) { for(i=0; i<B_Size; i++) secret[i] = 0; } return good; Let suppose that the array variable secret is secret, and all the other variables are public. Intuitively this a sort of one-time check password verifying that in p = secret and otherwise overwrites the array secret with zero. Obviously, this function is not constant-time as the variable good depends on secret, and hence branching on good violates the principles of constant-time programming. It is easy to transform this program into an equivalent one which is constant time. For example one could replace if (!good) { for(i=0; i<B_Size; i++) secret[i] = 0; } by for (i=0; i<B_Size; i++) {secret[i] = secret[i] & ct_eq(good,1);} But branching on good is a benign optimization, since anyway, the value of good is the normal output of the program. Hence, even if the function is not constanttime, it should be considered output-sensitive constant time with respect to its specification. Such optimization opportunities arise whenever the interface of the target application specifies what are the publicly observable outputs, and this information is sufficient to classify the extra leakage as benign [4] .
The objective of this work is to propose a static method to check if a program is output-sensitive constant time secure. We emphasize that our goal is not to verify that the legal output leaks "too much", but rather to ensure that the unintended (side-channel) output does not leak more than this legal output.
First, we propose a novel approach for verifying constant-time security based on a new information flow property, called output-sensitive noninterference. Information-flow security prevents confidential information to be leaked to public channels. Noninterference states that a public observer cannot learn anything about the private data. Since real systems need to intentionally declassify some information, this property is too strong. An alternative is relaxed noninterference which allows to specify explicit downgrading policies. In order to take into account public outputs while staying independent of how programs intentionally declassify information, we develop an alternative solution: instead of using complex explicit policies for functions, we partition variables in three sets: input, output and leakage variables. Hence we distinguish between the legal public output and the information that can leak through side-channels, expressed by adding fresh additional leakage variables. Then we propose a typing system that can statically check that leakage variables do not leak more secret information than the public normal output. The novelty of our approach is that we track the dependence of leakage variables with respect to both the initial value of input variables (as classically the case for noninterference) and final values of output variables. Then, we show how to verify that a program written in a high-level language is output-sensitive constant time secure by using this typing system.
Since timed and cache-based attacks target the executions of programs, it is important to carry out this verification in a language close to the machineexecuted assembly code. Hence, we adapt our approach to a generic unstructured assembly language inspired from LLVM and we show how we can verify programs coded in LLVM. Finally, we developed a prototype tool implementing our type system and we show how it can be used to verify LLVM implementations.
To summarize, this work makes the following contributions described above: -in section 2 we reformulate output-sensitive constant-time as a new interesting noninterference property and we provide a sound type system that guarantees that well-typed programs are output-sensitive noninterferent; -in section 3 we show that this general approach can be used to verify that programs written in a high-level language are output-sensitive constant time; -in section 4 we adapt our approach to the LLVM-IR language and we develop a prototype tool that can be used to verify LLVM implementations.
σ(e) = 1 (While e Do c oD , σ) −→ σ σ(e) = 1 (While e Do c oD , σ) −→ (c; While e Do c oD , σ) In order to reason about the security of the code, we first develop our framework in While, a simple high-level structured programming language. In section 3 we shall enrich this simple language with arrays and in section 4 we adapt our approach to a generic unstructured assembly language. The syntax of While programs is listed below: c ::= x := e | skip | c 1 ; c 2 | If e then c 1 else c 2 fi | While e Do c oD Meta-variables x, e and c range over the sets of program variables V ar, expressions and programs, respectively. We leave the syntax of expressions unspecified, but we assume they are deterministic and side-effect free. The semantics is shown in Figure 1 . The reflexive and transitive closure of −→ is denoted by =⇒. A state σ maps variables to values, and we write σ(e) to denote the value of expression e in state σ. A configuration (c, σ) is a program c to be executed along with the current state σ. Intuitively, if we want to model the security of some program c with respect to side-channel attacks, we can assume that there are three special subsets of variables: X I the public input variables, X O the public output variables and X L the variables that leak information to some malicious adversary. Then, output sensitive nonintereference asks that every two complete executions starting with X I -equivalent states and ending with X O -equivalent final states must be indistinguishable with respect to the leakage variables X L . Definition 1. (adapted from [4] ) Let X I , X O , X L ⊆ V ar be three sets of variables, intended to represent the input, the output and the leakage of a program. A program c is (X I , X O , X L )-secure when all its executions starting with X Iequivalent stores and leading to X O -equivalent final stores, give X L -equivalent final stores. Formally, for all σ, σ ′ , ρ, ρ ′ , if c, σ =⇒ σ ′ and c, ρ =⇒ ρ ′ and σ = XI ρ and
Typing rules
This section introduces a type-based information flow analysis that allows to check whether a While program is output-sensitive noninterferent, i.e. the program does not leak more information about the secret inputs than the public normal output. As usual, we consider a flow lattice of security levels L. An element x of L is an atom if x = ⊥ and there exists no element y ∈ L such that ⊥ ⊏ y ⊏ x. A lattice is called atomistic if every element is the join of atoms below it. Assumption 2.21 Let (L, ⊓, ⊔, ⊥, ⊤) be an atomistic continuous bounded lattice. As usual, we denote t 1 ⊑ t 2 iff t 2 = t 1 ⊔ t 2 . We assume that there exists a distinguished subset T O ⊆ L of atoms. Hence, from the above assumption, for any τ o , τ ′ o ∈ T O and for any t 1 , t 2 ∈ L: it holds that
A type environment Γ : V ar → L describes the security levels of variables and the dependency with respect to the current values of variables in X O . In order to catch dependencies with respect to current values of output variables, we associate to each output variable o ∈ X O a fixed and unique symbolic type α(o) ∈ T O . For example if some variable x ∈ V ar has the type Γ (x) = Low⊔α(o), it means that the value of x depends only on public input and the current value of the output variable o ∈ X O .
Hence, we assume that there is a fixed injective mapping α :
We extend mappings Γ and α to sets of variables in the usual way: given A ⊆ V ar and
Our type system aims to satisfy the following output sensitive non-interference condition: if the final values of output variables in X O remain the same, only changes to initial inputs with types ⊑ t should be visible to leakage outputs with type ⊑ t ⊔ α(X O ). More precisely, given a derivation ⊢ α Γ {c}Γ ′ , the final value of a variable x with final type Γ ′ (x) = t ⊔ α(A) for some t ∈ L and A ⊆ X O , should depend at most on the initial values of those variables y with initial types Γ (y) ⊑ t and on the final values of variables in A. We call "real dependencies" the dependencies with respect to initial values of variables and "symbolic dependencies" the dependencies with respect to the current values of output variables. Following [19] we formalize the non-interference condition satisfied by the typing system using reflexive and symmetric relations.
We write = A0 for relation which relates mappings which are equal on all values in A 0 i.e. for two mappings f 1 , f 2 : A → B and A 0 ⊆ A, f 1 = A0 f 2 iff ∀a ∈ A 0 , f 1 (a) = f 2 (a). For any mappings f 1 : A 1 → B and f 2 : A 2 → B, we write f 1 [f 2 ] the operation which updates f 1 according to f 2 , namely
Given Γ : V ar → L , X ⊆ V ar and t ∈ L, we write = Γ,X,t for the reflexive and symmetric relation which relates states that are equal on all variables having type v ⊑ t in environment Γ , provided that they are equal on all variables in X:
) . When X = ∅, we omit it, hence we write = Γ,t instead of = Γ,∅,t .
Definition 2.
[20] Let R and S be reflexive and symmetric relations on states. We say that program c maps R into S, written c :
The type system we propose enjoys the following useful property:
This property is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.
Hence, in order to prove that the above program c is output sensitive noninterferent according to Definition 1, it is enough to check that for all
. Two executions of the program c starting from initial states that coincide on input variables X I , and ending in final states that coincide on output variables X O , will coincide also on the leaking variables X L .
We now formally introduce our typing system. Due to assignments, values and types of variables change dynamically. For example let us assume that at some point during the execution, the value of x depends on the initial value of some variable y and the current value of some output variable o (which itself depends on the initial value of some variable h), formally captured by an environment Γ where Γ (o) = Γ 0 (h) and Γ (x) = Γ 0 (y) ⊔ α(o), where Γ 0 represents the initial environment. If the next to be executed instruction is some assignment to o, then the current value of o will change, so we have to mirror this in the new type of x: even if the value of x does not change, its new type will be
is obtained by replacing in Γ (x) the symbolic dependency α(o) with the real dependency Γ (o). 
Now we extend this definition to environments: let x ∈ X O and p ∈ L. Then
represents the environment where the symbolic dependency on the last value of x of all variables is replaced by the real type of x:
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of the Assumption 2.21 and Definition 3.
We want now to extend the above definition from a single output variable x to subsets X ⊆ X O . Our typing system will ensure that each generated environment Γ will not contain circular symbolic dependencies between output variables, i.e., there are no output variable
is an acyclic graph. For acyclic graphs G(Γ ), we define a preorder over X O , denoted ⊑ Γ , as the transitive closure of the relation
We also define the reachable variables of x ∈ X O w.r.t. Γ , denoted GT Γ (x), to be the set of all o ∈ X O such that x ⊑ Γ o. Now, for acyclic graphs G(Γ ), we can extend Definition 3 to subsets X ⊆ X O , by first fixing an ordering
The following lemma can be proved by induction on the size of X using Lemma 1.
For all variables x ∈ X, and all variables y ∈ V ar, α(x) ⊑ Γ 2 (y).
For all variables
Next Lemma gives a precise characterization of the new preorder induced by the application of the operator ⊳ α .
Lemma 3. Let Γ be a well formed environment and let
Proof: The key remark is that any edge of G(Γ 1 ) where Γ 1 def = Γ ⊳ α x corresponds to either an edge or to a path of length two in G(Γ ). Indeed, let x 1 , x 2 ∈ X O such that there exists an edge from 
Hence either there is an edge from x 1 to x 2 in G(Γ ) or there must exist edges from x 1 to x and from x to x 2 (and hence a path of length two from
. Now the assertion of the Lemma is an immediate consequence of the above remark and Lemma 1.
Let aff (c) be the set of assigned variables in a program c, formally defined by:
if c ≡ While e Do c oD and let us denote aff
We define the ordering over environments as usual:
We also define a restricted ordering over environments:
Is is immediate that Γ 1 ⊑ r Γ 2 implies Γ 1 ⊑ Γ 2 . Intuitively, when enriching an environment using ⊑ r , we have the right to add only "real dependencies" (and not "symbolic" dependencies with respect to variables in X O ). We adapt this definition for elements t 1 , t 2 ∈ L as well: we denote t 1 ⊑ r t 2 when t 1 ⊑ t 2 , and for all o ∈ X O , α(o) ⊑ t 2 ⇒ α(o) ⊑ t 1 , i.e. t 2 does not contain new symbolic dependencies w.r.t. t 1 .
Next lemma is immediate from the definitions.
The last assertion of the lemma is a consequence of the remark that Γ 1 ⊳ α X ⊑ r Γ 3 implies that Γ 3 does not contain more "symbolic dependencies" than Γ 1 ⊳ α X, and Γ 1 ⊳ α X does not contain any "symbolic dependencies" with respect to variables in X. Obviously, using that ⊑ r ⊆⊑, all inequalities hold also when the premise
For a command c, judgements have the form p ⊢ α Γ {c}Γ ′ where p ∈ L and Γ and Γ ′ are type environments well-formed. The inference rules are shown in Figure 2 . The idea is that if Γ describes the security levels of variables which hold before execution of c, then Γ ′ will describe the security levels of those variables after execution of c. The type p represents the usual program counter level and serves to eliminate indirect information flows; the derivation rules ensure that all variables that can be changed by c will end up (in Γ ′ ) with types greater than or equal to p. As usual, whenever p = ⊥ we drop it and write ⊢ α Γ {c}Γ ′ instead of ⊥ ⊢ α Γ {c}Γ ′ . Throughout this paper the type of an expression e is defined simply by taking the lub of the types of its free variables Γ [α](f v(e)), for example the type of x + y + o where o is the only output variable is Γ (x) ⊔ Γ (y) ⊔ α(o). This is consistent with the typing rules used in many systems, though more sophisticated typing rules for expressions would be possible in principle. Notice that considering the type of an expression to be Γ [α](f v(e)) instead of Γ (f v(e)) allows to capture the dependencies with respect to the current values of output variables. In order to give some intuition about the rules, we present a simple example in Figure 3 . Example 1. Let {x, y, z, u} ⊆ V ar \X O and {o 1 , o 2 , o 3 } ⊆ X O be some variables, and let us assume that ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, α(o i ) = O i . We assume that the initial environment is
Since the types of variables x, u and o 3 do not change, we omit them in the following. We highlighted the changes with respect to the previous environment. After the first assignment, the type of o 1 becomes X, meaning that the current value of o 1 depends on the initial value of x. After the assignment y := o 1 + z, the type of y becomes O 1 ⊔ Z, meaning that the current value of y depends on the initial value of z and the current value of o 1 . After the assignment o 1 = u, the type of y becomes X ⊔ Z as o 1 changed and we have to mirror this in the dependencies of y, and the type of o 1 becomes X. When we enter in the If , the program counter level changes to p = O 3 ⊔ O 2 ⊔ X as the expression o 2 = o 3 + x depends on the values of variables o 2 , o 3 , x, but o 2 and o 3 are output variables and o 2 will be assigned by the If command, hence we replace the "symbolic"
At the end of the If command, we do the join of the two environments obtained after the both branches, but in order to prevent cycles, we first replace the "symbolic" dependencies by the corresponding "real" dependencies for each output variable that is assigned by the other branch.
Well-formed environments
In this section we prove that, if the initial environment is well-formed, then all the environments generated by the typing system are well-formed too. To do so, the following lemma states some useful properties, where for any p ∈ L, we denote by atomO(p)
Proof: Proof is by induction on the derivation of p ⊢ α Γ {c}Γ ′ for all assertions in the same time. We do a case analysis according to the last rule applied (case Skip is trivial).
(Ass1) c is an assignment x := e for some x ∈ X O . Since x ∈ X O , it follows that G(Γ ′ ) = G(Γ ) and obviously for any x ∈ aff (c),
, and using Lemma 1 we get that AC(Γ 1 ) does not contain any edge with origin o and hence AC(Γ ′ ). The second part follows from the remark that using Lemma 3 we get
Using the induction hypothesis for p ⊢ α Γ {c 1 }Γ 1 we get that AC(Γ 1 ), and for
Using the induction hypothesis for p ⊢ α Γ 1 {c 2 }Γ 2 we get that AC(Γ 2 ), and for
⊑ r Γ 2 (x). We used whenever necessarily Lemma 5; in addition, in (1) we used that (Γ ⊳ α U 1 )(x) does not depend on variables in U 1 , and by induction hypothesis for all variables (3) we used that x ∈ U 2 , and hence by induction hypothesis,
. Now if we assume by contradiction that ¬AC(Γ ′ ), we get that there must exist
We make an analysis by case:
• x 1 ∈ U 1 ∩U 2 . Impossible, since we have that AC(Γ 1 ⊳ α U 2 ) and AC(Γ 2 ⊳ α U 1 ), and for any o ∈ X O , x 1 ⊑ Γ1⊳αU2 o and
• x 1 ∈ U 1 \U 2 and x 2 ∈ U 1 . From induction hypothesis we get
• x 1 ∈ U 1 ∪U 2 and x 2 ∈ U 1 ∪U 2 . In this case, by induction
• The remaining cases are symmetrical ones with the previous cases. (While) Similar to the rule (If).
(Sub) Trivial from the premises of the rule, using the induction hypothesis, the transitivity of ⊑ r and that
Soundness of the typing system
As already stated above, our type system aims to capture the following noninterference condition: given a derivation p ⊢ α Γ {c}Γ ′ , the final value of a variable x with final type t ⊔ α(X O ), should depend at most on the initial values of those variables y with initial types Γ (y) ⊑ t and on the final values of variables in X O . Or otherwise said, executing a program c on two initial states σ and ρ such that σ(y) = ρ(y) for all y with Γ (y) ⊑ t which ends with two final states σ ′ and
. In order to prove the soundness of the typing system, we need a stronger invariant denoted I(t, Γ ): intuitively, (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t,
Formally, given t ∈ L and Γ : V ar → L, we define I(t, Γ )
The following lemmas provide some useful properties satisfied by the invariant I(t, Γ ).
Proof: Assume (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ 1 ). We prove that (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ 2 ). Let A ⊆ X O and let y ∈ V ar such that Γ 2 (y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t. Assume that σ = A ρ. We have to prove that σ(y) = ρ(y). We have Γ 1 (y) ⊑ r Γ 2 (y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t, and since (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ 1 ) and σ = A ρ, we get σ(y) = ρ(y).
Proof: We prove only the first inclusion, the second one can be easily proved by induction using the first one.
Let σ, ρ such that (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ) and let us prove that (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ 1 ). Let B ⊆ X O and let y ∈ V ar such that Γ 1 (y) ⊑ α(B) ⊔ t. Assume that σ = B ρ. We have to prove that σ(y) = ρ(y).
Then
-If Γ (y) ⊑ α(B) ⊔ t, since σ = B ρ and (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ) we get σ(y) = ρ(y).
-If Γ (y) ⊑ α(B) ⊔ α(x) ⊔ t and Γ (x) ⊑ α(B) ⊔ t, from σ = B ρ and (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ), we get σ = {x} ρ, and hence σ = B∪{x} ρ. Since Γ (y) ⊑ α(B)⊔α(x)⊔t and σ = Γ,B∪{x},α(B∪{x})⊔t ρ, we get σ(y) = ρ(y).
Lemma 8.
Let o ∈ X O and let Γ ′ = Γ ⊳ α o with well formed AC(Γ ). Let t ∈ L and let (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ).For any A ⊆ X O such that σ = A\{o} ρ and for any y ∈ V ar such that Γ ′ (y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t it holds that σ(y) = ρ(y).
Proof: AC(Γ ) and
-If Γ (y) ⊑ α(A\{o})⊔t, as σ = A\{o} ρ and (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ) we get σ(y) = ρ(y).
-If Γ (y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t and Γ (o) ⊑ α(A \ {o}) ⊔ t, from σ = A\{o} ρ and (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ), we get σ = {o} ρ, and hence σ = A ρ. Since Γ (y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t and σ = Γ,A,α(A)⊔t ρ, we get σ(y) = ρ(y).
Lemma 9. Let Γ ′ = Γ ⊳ α U for a well formed AC(Γ ) where U = {o 1 , . . . , o n } ⊆ X O . Let t ∈ L and let (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ). For any A ⊆ X O such that σ = A\U ρ and for any y ∈ V ar such that Γ ′ (y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t it holds that σ(y) = ρ(y).
Proof: By induction on n. The case n = 1 follows from the lemma 8. Let us denote U n−1 = U \ {o n } = {o 1 , . . . , o n−1 }. and let Γ n−1 = Γ ⊳ α U n−1 . Hence
By lemma 3, Γ n−1 is well formed too. AC(Γ n−1 ) and
ρ, we get by induction (taking U ′ = U n−1 and A ′ = A\{o n }) that σ = {on} ρ, and hence σ = A\Un−1 ρ. From Γ n−1 (y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t and σ = A\Un−1 ρ using the induction again (taking U ′ = U n−1 and A ′ = A) we get σ(y) = ρ(y).
The following theorem states the soundness of our typing system.
Theorem 1. Let us assume that AC(Γ ) and ∀o ∈
Proof: Proof is by induction on the derivation of p ⊢ α Γ {c}Γ ′ . Let σ, σ ′ , ρ, ρ ′ such that (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ) and c, σ =⇒ σ ′ and c, ρ =⇒ ρ ′ . We prove that (σ ′ , ρ ′ ) ∈ I(t, Γ ′ ). Let A ⊆ X O and let y ∈ V ar such that Γ ′ (y) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t. Assume that σ ′ = A ρ ′ . We have to prove that σ ′ (y) = ρ ′ (y). We do a case analysis according to the last rule applied (case Skip is trivial).
(Ass1) c is an assignment x := e for some x ∈ X O .
⊔ t, and since σ = Γ,A,α(A)⊔t ρ, we get σ ′ (y) = σ(y) = ρ(y) = ρ ′ (y). Let us assume that c is y := e for some e and y ∈ X O . Then
and this implies that: 1) for all variables
We get that σ(e) = ρ(e), and hence σ
Using Lemma 7, we get that (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ 1 ), where
and 2) for all variables v ∈ f v(e) ∩ X O , α(v) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t, hence v ∈ A and σ(v) = ρ(v). We get that σ(e) = ρ(e), and hence σ ′ (y) = ρ ′ (y). (Ass3) c is an assignment o := e for some o ∈ X O ∩ f v(e). Similar to the previous case, using the remark that Γ (o) ⊑ α(A) ⊔ t implies that σ(o) = ρ(o). (Seq) Trivial, using the transitivity of =⇒.
(If) Let us denote
, obviously we get y ∈ aff (c), i.e. c contains no assignments to y. Hence σ ′ (y) = σ(y) and ρ(y) = ρ ′ (y). Then from Lemma 7, we get that (Γ ⊳ α (U 1 ∪U 2 ))(y) ⊑ r Γ ′ (y) ⊑ α(A)⊔t. Moreover, σ ′ = A ρ ′ implies that σ = A\(U1∪U2) ρ and using Lemma 9 we get σ(y) = ρ(y), and hence σ
Using Lemma 9, we get for each variable v ∈ f v(e) that σ(v) = ρ(v). This proves that σ(e) = ρ(e) and hence both executions c, σ =⇒ σ ′ and c, ρ =⇒ ρ ′ take the same branch i. Then we use the induction hypothesis applied to p ⊔ p ′ ⊢ α Γ {c i }Γ i to get that (σ ′ , ρ ′ ) ∈ I(t, Γ i ), and then, since
we use Lemmas 6 and 7 to conclude (σ
. From (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ), using Lemma 7, we get (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ⊳ α U ) and using now Lemma 6 and the inequality
′ , we obtain (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ′ ). Using the induction hypothesis applied to p ⊔ p e ⊢ α Γ ′ {c}Γ 1 , we get that (σ ′ , ρ ′ ) ∈ I(t, Γ 1 ). We apply again Lemma 7 and we get (σ ′ , ρ ′ ) ∈ I(t, Γ 1 ⊳ α U ), and using Lemma 6 and that
Trivial, from Lemma 6 and the induction hypothesis.
Soundness w.r.t. to output-sensitive non-interference
In this section we show how we can use the typing system in order to prove that a program c is output-sensitive noninterferent. Let V ar
We denote ⊥ = τ ∅ and ⊤ = τ V ar e and we consider the lattice (L, ⊥, ⊤, ⊑) with
The following Theorem is a consequence of the Definition 1 and Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let L be the lattice described above. Let (Γ, α) be defined by Γ (x) = {τ x }, for all x ∈ V ar and
(While e Do c oD , σ)
(While e Do c oD , σ) act −→ (c; While e Do c oD , σ)
Fig. 4. Syntax and Labeled Operational semantics
Proof: Let t = Γ (X I ). First, we prove that if σ = XI ρ, then (σ, ρ) ∈ I(t, Γ ).
. This implies that y ∈ X I , and since σ = XI ρ, we get σ(y) = ρ(y). Now let σ, σ ′ , ρ, ρ ′ , such c, σ =⇒ σ ′ and c, ρ =⇒ ρ ′ and σ = XI ρ and
We have to prove that σ ′ = X l ρ ′ . Let us apply the Theorem 1 with t = Γ (X I ). Since ⊢ α Γ {c}Γ ′ and (σ, ρ) ∈ I 1 (t, Γ ), we get that
Since by hypothesis we have that
3 Output-sensitive constant-time To simplify notations, we assume that array indexes e 1 are basic expressions (not referring to arrays) and that X O does not contain arrays. Moreover as in [4] , a state or store σ maps array variables v and indices i ∈ AE to values σ(v, i).
The labeled semantics of While programs is listed in Figure 4 . In all rules, we denote
are the indexed variables in e. The labels on the execution steps correspond to the information which is leaked to the environment (r() for a read access on memory, w() for a write access and b() for a branch operation). In the rules for (If) and (While) the valuations of branch conditions are leaked. Also, all indexes to program variables read and written at each statement are exposed.
We give in Figure 5 the new typing rules. As above, we denote − → f = (f i ) i , where x i [f i ] are the indexed variables in e. We add a fresh variable x l , that is not used in programs, in order to capture the unintended leakage. Its type is always growing up and it mirrors the information leaked by each command. In rule (As1") we take a conservative approach and we consider that the type of an Following [4] , given a set X of program variables, two stores σ and ρ are Xequivalent when σ(x, i) = ρ(x, i) for all x ∈ X and i ∈ AE. Two executions We can reduce the (X I , X O )-constant time security of a command c to the (X I , X O , {x l })-security (see section 2.5) of a corresponding command ω(c), obtained by adding a fresh variable x l to the program variables f v(c), and then adding recursively before each assignment and each boolean condition predicate, a new assignment to the leakage variable x l that mirrors the leaked information.
•
If e then c1 else c2 fi x l := x l : b(e) : r( − → f ); If e then ω(c1) else ω(c2) fi While e Do c oD Let :, b(, )r(, )w() be some new abstract operators. The construction of the instrumentation ω(•) is shown in Fig. 6 . As above, we denote
, where
First we can extend the While language with array variables, then we need to extend the typing system from section 2.2 with a rule corresponding to the new rule Ast ′ . Then, the following lemma gives the relationship between the type of a program c using the new typing system and the type of the instrumented program ω(c) using the extended typing system from the previous section.
Lemma 10. Let c a command such that x l ∈ f v(c), σ, σ ′ two stores , tr some execution trace and [] the empty trace.
Now combining Theorem 2 and Lemma 10 we get the following Theorem which proves the soundness of the new typing system. Theorem 3. Let L be the lattice defined in the section 2.5. Let (Γ, α) be defined by Γ (x) = {τ x }, for all x ∈ V ar and
Application to low-level code
We show in this section how the type system we proposed to express outputsensitive constant-time non-interference on the While language can be lifted to a low-level program representation like the LLVM byte code [21] .
LLVM-IR
We consider a simplified LLVM-IR representation with four instructions: assignments from an expression (register or immediate value) or from a memory block (load), writing to a memory block (store) and (un)conditional jump instructions. We assume that the program control flow is represented by a control-flow graph r ← op(Op, − → v ) assign to r the result of Op applied to operands − → v r ← load(v) load in r the value stored at address pointed by v store(v1, v2) store at address pointed by v2 the value v1 cond(r, b then , b else ) branch to b then if the value of r is true and to b f alse otherwise goto b branch to b Fig. 7 . Syntax and informal semantics of simplified LLVM-IR
where B is the set of basic blocks, → E the set of edges connecting the basic blocks, b init ∈ B the entry point and b end ∈ B the ending point. We denote by Reach(b, b ′ ) the predicate indicating that node b ′ is reachable from node b, i.e., there exists a path in G from b to b ′ . A program is then a (partial) map from control points (b, n) ∈ B × N to instructions where each basic block is terminated by a jump instruction. The memory model consists in a set of registers or temporary variables R and a set of memory blocks M (including the execution stack). V al is the set of values and memory block addresses. The informal semantics of our simplified LLVM-IR is given in Figure 7 , where r ∈ R and v ∈ R ∪ V al is a register or an immediate value.
In the formal operational semantics, execution steps are labelled with leaking data, i.e., addresses of store and load operations and branching conditions. This formal semantics is defined in Figure 8 . ′ and b such that b" post-dominates b ′ . We recall that a node b 1 dominates (resp. post-dominates) a node b 2 iff every path from the entry node b init to b 2 goes through b 1 (resp. every path from b 2 to the ending node b end goes through b 1 ). 2. Partial function br : B → R returns the "branching register", i.e., the register r used to compute the branching condition leading outside b (b is terminated by an instruction cond(r, b then , b else )). Note that in LLVM branching registers are always fresh and assigned only once before to be used.
M returns the set of (addresses of) memory blocks pointed to by a given register or memory block at a given control point. For example, bl ∈ P tsT o(b, n)(r) means that at control point (b, n), register r may contain the address of block bl ∈ M .
We now define a type system (Figures 9 to 12 ) that allows to express the output-sensitive constant-time property for LLVM-IR -like programs. The main difference with respect to the rules given at the source level (Figures 2 and 5) is that the control-flow is explicitly given by the CFG, and not by the language syntax. For a LLVM-like program, an environment Γ : R ∪ M → L, associates security types to registers and memory blocks. Assignment from an operation Op (Figure 9 ). In rules Op0 and Op2, the new type τ of the assigned register r is the join of the type of operands − → v and the type of all the branching conditions dominating the current basic block (τ 0 ). Note that since branching registers r are assigned only once in LLVM there is no need to update their dependencies from output variables (using the ⊳ α operator), Γ (r) being never changed once r has been assigned. Assignment from a load expression ( Figure 10 ). Rules Ld1 and Ld2 update Γ in a similar way as Op1 and Op2, the main difference being that since some of the memory locations accessed when dereferencing v (i.e., P tsT o(b, n)(v)) are in A m (i.e., potentially in the cache) the dependencies of v are added to the type of the leakage variable x l . Fig. 11 . store instruction Store instruction ( Figure 11 ). Rule St updates the dependencies of all memory locations pointed to by v 2 by adding the types of v 1 and v 2 itself. In addition, the type of the leakage variable x l is also updated with the dependencies of v 2 and with the dependencies of all branching registers that influenced the execution flow to reach the current block b. 
In the above definition the set A is mandatory in order to prevent dependency cycles between variables in X O .
The following Theorem is the counterpart of Theorem 3. It shows the soundness of our type system for LLVM-IR programs with respect to output-sensitive constant-time.
Theorem 4. Let L be the lattice from the section 2.5. Let (Γ, α) be defined by
Example
We illustrate below the effect of the LLVM-IR typing rules on a short example. The C code of this example is given on Figure 13 , and the corresponding (simplified) LLVM-IR on Figure 14 . 
This initial environment captures the idea that the values of variables @p, @q, %x, %y are addresses (of memory blocks corresponding to the "high-level" C variables p, q, x and y) and hence their security type is ⊥, and the memory blocks b 0 to b 3 correspond to the C variables p, q, x and y, and this is mirrored in the initial environment Γ 0 . Moreover, initially, nothing is leaked yet.
We then update Γ 0 by applying our typing rules in sequence to each instruction of the LLVM-IR representation. Note that the getelementptr instruction, which is specific to LLVM, allows to compute an address corresponding to an indexed access in a buffer. Hence, it is treated by our typing system as an arithmetic (Op) instruction.
%1 = load %y
store %3, %5
Making all the replacements, we get that the final environment is:
In this final environment Γ 6 , variable x l depends on the initial types X and Y assigned to memory blocks b 2 and b 3 . This means that the addresses accessed when reading (resp. writing) buffer p (resp. q) may leak to an attacker. Hence, if one of the variables x or y is a secret, since neither x nor y is an output value, then this program is not output sensitive constant-time, which may lead to a security issue.
Implementation
We are developing a prototype tool implementing the type system for LLVM programs. This type system consists in computing flow-sensitive dependency relations between program variables. Def. 5 provides the necessary conditions under which the obtained result is sound (Theorem 4). We give some technical indications regarding our implementation. Output variables X O are defined as function return values and global variables; we do not currently consider arrays nor pointers in X O . Control dependencies cannot be deduced from the syntactic LLVM level, we need to explicitly compute the dominance relation between basic blocks of the CFG (the dep function). Def. 5 requires the construction of a set A ⊆ X O to update the environment produced at each control locations in order to avoid circular dependencies (when output variable are assigned in alternative execution paths). To identify the set of basic blocks belonging to such alternative execution paths leading to a given block, we use the notion of Hammock regions [15] . More precisely, we compute function Reg : 
. ¬Reach(b i , c)}. Fix-point computations are implemented using Kildall's algorithm. To better handle real-life examples we are currently implementing the P tsT o function, an inter-procedural analysis, and a more precise type analysis combining both overand under-approximations of variable dependencies (see section 6).
Related Work
Information flow. There is a large number of papers on language-based security aiming to prevent undesired information flows using type systems (see [26] ). An information-flow security type system statically ensures noninterference, i.e. that sensitive data may not flow directly or indirectly to public channels [30, 24, 29, 28] . The typing system presented in section 2.2 builds on ideas from Hunt and Sands'
As attractive as it is, noninterference is too strict to be useful in practice, as it prevents confidential data to have any influence on observable, public output: even a simple password checker function violates noninterference. Relaxed definitions of noninterference have been defined in order to support such intentional downward information flows [27] . Li and Zdancewic [22] proposed an expressive mechanism called relaxed noninterference for declassification policies that supports the extensional specification of secrets and their intended declassification. A declassification policy is a function that captures the precise information on a confidential value that can be declassified. For the password checker example, the following declassification policy λp.λx.h(p) == x, allows an equality comparison with the hash of password to be declassified (and made public), but disallows arbitrary declassifications such as revealing the password.
The problem of information-flow security has been studied also for low level languages. Barthe and Rezk [8, 9] provide a flow sensitive type system for a sequential bytecode language. As it is the case for most analyses, implicit flows are forbidden, and hence, modifications of parts of the environment with lower security type than the current context are not allowed. Genaim and Spoto present in [16] a compositional information flow analysis for full Java bytecode.
Information flow applied to detecting side-channel leakages. Informationflow analyses track the flow of information through the program but often ignore information flows through side channels. Side-channel attacks extract sensitive information about a program's state through its observable use of resources such as time or memory. Several approaches in language-based security use security type systems to detect timing side-channels [1, 18] . Agat [1] presents a type system sensitive to timing for a small While-language which includes a transformation which takes a program and transforms it into an equivalent program without timing leaks. Molnar et al [23] introduce the program counter model, which is equivalent to path non-interference, and give a program transformation for making programs secure in this model.
FlowTracker [25] allows to statically detect time-based side-channels in LLVM programs. Relying on the assumption that LLVM code is in SSA form, they compute control dependencies using a sparse analysis [13] without building the whole Program Dependency Graph. Leakage at assembly-level is also considered in [6] . They propose a fine-grained information-flow analysis for checking that assembly programs generated by CompCert are constant-time. Moreover, they consider a stronger adversary which controls the scheduler and the cache.
All the above works do not consider publicly observable outputs. The work that is closest to ours is [4] , where the authors develop a formal model for constant-time programming policies. The novelty of their approach is that it is distinguishing not only between public and private input values, but also between private and publicly observable output values. As they state, this distinction poses interesting technical and theoretical challenges. Moreover, constant-time implementations in cryptographic libraries like OpenSSL include optimizations for which paths and addresses can depend not only on public input values, but also on publicly observable output values. Considering only input values as nonsecret information would thus incorrectly characterize those implementations as non-constant-time. They also develop a verification technique based on the self-composition based approach [7] . They reduce the constant time security of a program P to safety of a product program Q that simulates two parallel executions of P. The tool operates at the LLVM bytecode level. The obtained bytecode program is transformed into a product program which is verified by the Boogie verifier [5] and its SMT tool suite. Their approach is complete only if the public output is ignored. Otherwise, their construction relies on identifying the branches whose conditions can only be declared benign when public outputs are considered. For all such branches, the verifier needs to consider separate paths for the two simulated executions, rather than a single synchronized path and in the worst case this can deteriorate to an expensive product construction.
Conclusion and Perspectives
In this paper we proposed a static approach to check if a program is outputsensitive constant-time, i.e., if the leakage induced through branchings and/or memory accesses do not overcome the information produced by (regular) observable outputs. Our verification technique is based on a so-called output-sensitive non-interference property, allowing to compute the dependencies of a leakage variable from both the initial values of the program inputs and the final values of its outputs. We developed a type system on a high-level While language, and we proved its soundness. Then we lifted this type system to a basic LLVM-IR and we developed a prototype tool operating on this intermediate representation, showing the applicability of our technique.
This work could be continued in several directions. One limitation of our method arising in practice is that even if the two snippets x l = h; o = h and o = h; x l = o are equivalent, only the latter can be typed by our typing system. We are currently extending our approach by considering also an underapproximation β(•) of the dependencies between variables and using "symbolic dependencies" also for non-output variables. Then the safety condition from Theorem 2 can be improved to something like "∃V such that (
In the above example, we would obtain Γ ′ (x l ) = α(h) = β ′ (o) ⊑ α(o) ⊔ β ′ (o), meaning that the unwanted maximal leakage Γ ′ (x l ) is less than the minimal leakage β ′ (o) due to the normal output. From the implementation point of view, further developments are needed in or-der to extend our prototype to a complete tool able to deal with real-life case studies. This may require to refine our notion of arrays and to take into account arrays and pointers as output variables. We could also consider applying a sparse analysis, as in FlowTracker [25] . It may happen that such a pure static analysis would be too strict, rejecting too much "correct" implementations. To solve this issue, a solution would be to combine it with the dynamic verification technique proposed in [4] . Thus, our analysis could be used to find automatically which branching conditions are benign in the output-sensitive sense, which could reduce the product construction of [4] . Finally, another interesting direction would be to adapt our work in the context of quantitative analysis for program leakage, like in [14] .
